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ABSTRACT 
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become an integral part of global architecture, and 
efforts to bring public and private actors together to solve policy issues are reshaping global 
norms. The purpose of this exploratory research is to investigate the extent to which PPPs 
entrench private sector involvement in global governance, setting a universal norm wherein 
private entities are at the forefront of global policymaking—specifically in reference to one 
issue, that of promoting food security. The constructivist approach taken here focuses on the 
creation and legitimization of new global policymaking norms by examining identities and 
interests related to the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, with a particular focus 
on Ghana and its private sector partners. To demonstrate how the PPP concept is becoming a 
global norm, the analysis reviews the notion through a process of knowledge development that 
includes three steps—normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation. Examples from around the 
world detailing PPP institutionalization are given to show how PPPs have been normalized and 
fragmented on the global scale. Then, Ghanaian-focused documents along with relevant 
examples from Ethiopia and Tanzania are analyzed to explore how the PPP concept is being 
assimilated under the G8’s New Alliance. 	
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 1.1 Context and Significance of the Thesis 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become an integral part of global architecture, and 
efforts to bring public and private actors together to solve policy issues are reshaping global 
norms. This is evident by actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
which, in 2000, passed Resolution 55/2, better known as the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration. In this resolution, the UNGA created eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) towards which the world should aim. These goals included eradicating extreme poverty 
and hunger, achieving high primary education rates, promoting gender equality, reducing child 
mortality rates, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensuring 
environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development.1 The MDGs 
were to be achieved after fifteen years, and were to expire in 2015. However, not all the MDGs 
were met within this timeframe, though much progress was made, especially in the areas of 
lowering poverty, increasing primary school enrollment, combating HIV/AIDS, decreasing 
maternal and child mortality, and improving water quality and access.2 
 Following the expiration of the MDGs, the UNGA met in New York on 25 September 
2015 and “adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle 
climate change by 2030.”3 Unlike the MDGs, which had some quantifiable measures (e.g., 
reducing the proportion of people suffering from hunger by 50 percent between 1990 and 2015),4 
the SDGs are vague and seem to be far reaching in their aspirations. For example, the second 
																																																								
1 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, 
2 “Millennium Development Goals,” United Nations Development Program, accessed October 
10, 2015, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg_goals/. 
3 “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),” United Nations Development Program, accessed 
October 10, 2015, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-
development-agenda/. 
4 “Goals, targets and indicators,” UN Millennium Project, accessed October 10, 2015, 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm#goal5.	
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goal listed aims to eradicate all forms of hunger by 2030.5 Comprehensive goals such as these 
can be useful for rallying support, but are difficult or impossible to achieve. As Gavin Yamey, a 
professor at Duke Global Health Institute who spoke on the specific SDG calling for “Good 
health and well-being,” stated: "How do you even define well-being, let alone measure it?"6 As it 
turns out, similar to the MDGs, the SDGs look to achieve their aims by creating partnerships 
between private and public organizations.  
These PPPs are essential according the UNGA. Their importance is demonstrated by the 
fact that both the MDGs and the SDGs have, as one of their goals, a commitment to establishing 
such partnership, and, not surprisingly, these agreements are becoming increasingly frequent.7 
However, the increase witnessed globally in the use of PPPs as a strategy for addressing poverty 
and other ills of underdevelopment warrants additional studies because, arguably, these 
partnerships have an underlying bias. That is, they are grounded in a neoliberal ideology and are 
geared towards promoting market-oriented development. As a result, these accord to the private 
sector partners, especially mammoth global corporations such as Monsanto, a powerful role in 
development policies. Given that the role of the firm is profit maximization, it is quite likely that 
a strategy reliant on PPPs runs counter to promoting basic UN aims of reducing inequalities 
between peoples and upholding equal rights for everyone.  
It has been noted by some scholars that these partnerships lack transparency, compared to 
other UN projects, and that there is not much knowledge of their contribution to the 
sustainability of the above-mentioned goals.8 There has also been a question as to whether or not 
a conflict of interest exists regarding public funding of the private sector when some of these 
																																																								
5 “Goal 2: Zero hunger” United Nations Development Program, accessed November 24, 2015, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-
2.html. 
6 Marc Silver, “What, Really, Does ‘Sustainable’ Mean?” NPR, September 23, 2015, accessed 
October 10, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/09/23/442580821/what-
really-does-sustainable-mean.  
7 “Goal 17: Partnerships for the goals,” United Nations Development Program, accessed October 
12, 2015, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-
agenda/goal-17.html.  
8 Peter Utting and Ann Zammit, “United Nations-Business Partnerships: Good Intentions and 
Contradictory Agendas,” Journal of Business Ethics 90 (2009): 39.	
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partnerships have a corporate presence on the boards making financial decisions.9 Additionally, 
other scholars have concluded that PPPs too heavily reliant on the private sector to create change 
may not be the best way to spur innovation.10 Together, these concerns provide justification for 
further exploring PPPs, which will be done in the particular area of food security in this analysis. 
It is against this background that the present study is undertaken. Food security was selected as 
the area of focus since it, along with maternal care, is an MDG area in which numerous 
partnerships have been formed 
1.2 The Research Statement and its Rationale 
The purpose of this exploratory research is to investigate the extent to which PPPs entrench 
private sector involvement in global governance, setting a universal norm wherein private 
entities are at the forefront of global policymaking—specifically in reference to one issue, that of 
promoting food security. This means the emphasis here is on the creation and legitimization of 
new global policymaking norms, measured by the degree to which private sector participation 
has increased in public policymaking. To demonstrate this claim and show why private 
companies are motivated to enter PPPs, it will be useful to examine the benefits reaped by the 
private sector by engaging in such arrangements. The analysis, focused on norm creation, will 
draw upon discursive evidence related to the international system and food security to show the 
entrenchment of private entities in global policymaking. 
There are two counter-arguments that this study might encounter. First, the claim may be 
made that it does not matter if private interests are furthered in fields such as food security, so 
long as the eradication of hunger is achieved. The study shall not contest that “the proportion of 
undernourished people in the developing regions dropped by almost half since 1990.”11 Rather, it 
aims to uncover if global norms, identities, and interests are changing due to PPPs, and, if so, to 
highlight the changes. If such alterations are happening, it is vital to understand where, how, and 
why this contextual reshaping of world politics is occurring, especially if it involves non-state 																																																								
9 Allyn L. Taylor, “Public-Private Partnerships for Health: The United Nations Global Fund on 
Aids and Health,” The John Marshall Law Review 35, no. 3 (2002): 404.	
10 John Kirton, Julia Kulik, and Caroline Bracht, “The political process in global health and 
nutrition governance: the G8’s 2010 Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Child, and Newborn 
Health,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences no. 1331 (2014): 186-200.	
11 “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015,” United Nations Development Program, 
accessed November 24, 2015, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/the-
millennium-development-goals-report-2015.html.   
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actors gaining greater policy influence. Such changes have repercussions not only on 
international relations, but also for individuals.  
The second counter claim is that the investigator will be searching for evidence that 
makes the story believable. Though the complete removal of bias cannot be guaranteed, 
acknowledging it upfront can help mitigate this concern. Furthermore, a sense of positionality 
can be offered by saying the author has no affiliations with any corporation or entity that would 
benefit from this research. It is for purely academic purposes. Lastly, by using an inductive 
method such as discourse analysis, there is a set of assumptions upon which the findings will be 
built. These include understanding that meaning of language exists in a context that the author, 
reader, and the researcher construct. Data will provide the emergent categories or themes to be 
studied; such categories should reflect patterns in reality, and the analyst should consider their 
role in creating these patterns and meaning. Understanding these assumptions should help create, 
in the future, a better defense of the findings from the analysis.  
This study shall continue in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews the methodology 
informing this study. It justifies using a thematic case study that draws upon relevant documents 
and utilizes discourse analysis to uncover how discursive content shapes the reality and power 
relations that form norms. Chapter 3 looks at the literature focused on the formation of norms 
and PPPs. From a constructivist viewpoint, a theoretical framework to explore the emergence of 
PPPs and the norms to which they are giving rise is detailed. The chapter also discuses how 
norms influence actors’ choices, explores the construction of PPPs and how they are billed as 
win-win affairs, questions if corporations should be able to set their own normative standards 
under the guise of corporate social responsibly, and critiques neo-liberalization and the emerging 
market-state paradigm. Chapter 4 is the case study itself, and is broken into subsections. It 
examines food security and food regimes, defines the relevant actors involved in the G8 New 
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, with a particular focus on Ghana and its private sector 
partners, and demonstrates norm creation through the three steps of knowledge development—
normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation. To show how PPPs have already been 
normalized and fragmented on the global scale, examples from around the world detailing PPP 
institutionalization will be given. Then, to explore how the PPP concept is being assimilated 
under the G8’s New Alliance, Ghanaian-focused documents along with relevant examples from 
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Ethiopia and Tanzania are analyzed. Finally, Chapter 5 offers an alternative model to the current 
food regime, and some concluding thoughts about the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
Concerns about increased private sector involvement in global policymaking justify further 
exploration of PPPs, and one method that allows for this examination is a thematic case study. In 
this case study, the partnerships behind the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition are 
examined, providing insight into the roles public and private actors play in promoting African 
food security. Fieldwork was not conducted here, as the analysis draws upon relevant documents 
to provide a way to analyze such PPPs and the norms they create in relation to global 
policymaking and food security.  
 Within the case study, discourse analysis is the primary methodology used to explore the 
norms created by PPPs. Discourse analysis was selected because it can be used to uncover how 
discursive content shapes reality and power relations.12 This is because discourse, as understood 
here, can be seen as an institutionally consolidated flow of knowledge, “which determines 
individual and collective doing and/or formative action that shapes society, thus exercising 
power.”13 French philosopher Michel Foucault elaborates on how discourse informs systems and 
the rules residing in such structures:  
These systems of formation must not be taken as blocks of immobility, static forms that 
are imposed on discourse from the outside, and that define once and for all its 
characteristics and possibilities. They are not constraints whose origin is to be found in 
the thoughts of men, or in the play of their representations; but nor are they 
determinations which, formed at the level of institutions, or social or economic relations, 
transcribe themselves by force on the surface of discourses. These systems - I repeat - 
reside in discourse itself; or rather (since we are concerned not with its interiority and 
what it may contain, but with its specific existence and with its conditions) on its frontier, 
at that limit at which the specific rules that enable it to exist as such are defined. By 
system of formation, then, I mean a complex group of relations that function as a rule: it 
lays down what must be related, in a particular discursive practice, for such and such an 
enunciation to be made, for such and such a concept to be used, for such and such a 
strategy to be organized. To define a system of formation in its specific individuality is 
therefore to characterize a discourse or a group of statements by the regularity of a 
practice.14  																																																								
12 Siegfried Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a 
critical discourse and dispositive analysis,” in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth 
Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 33. 
13 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 34.  
14 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse of Language, trans. A. M. 
Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 73-74.  
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Defining discourse in such a manner inevitably means that one form of discourse, or 
representation, will eventually dominate other representations of reality, and that discourses in 
general are evolved, historically-grounded constructs of knowledge that affect individuals with 
or without their knowing.15 The task at hand, therefore, is to identify various representations and 
analyze the relationship(s) between the established discourses.16 
 It is possible that only one representation dominates a field, making the discourse closed. 
A historical analysis would show, however, this scenario is not apolitical because it takes much 
maneuvering for one representation to close out another. In cases where two or more 
representations exist, the field is said to be open and analyses should not necessarily focus on 
control but on the flow of information that creates and solidifies power.17 The dominating 
discourse in either case can be criticized by examining the means by which power was/is 
consolidated and reinforced.18  
One method employed within this methodology to detail the flow of power is institutional 
ethnography. As a way to map out social relations between the United Nations and private sector 
groups, institutional ethnography reveals how operating procedures and norms are formed by the 
organizing power of texts.19 For example, the analysis looks at strategic plans and policy 
documents, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations’ “Guidelines on Cooperation 
between the United Nations  and the Business Community20,” to demonstrate such claims. 
Performing such a task requires a close examination of the discourse utilized in the documents 
with a focus on semantics and context. This is when discourse analysis as a method comes into 
play, specifically in the form of critical discourse analysis. 
																																																								
15 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 36. 
16 Iver B. Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A 
Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
70.  
17 Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” p. 70-71.  
18 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 34. 
19 Marjorie L. Devault, “Introduction: What is Institutional Ethnography?” Social Problems 53, 
no. 3 (2006): 294-298.  
20 Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Guidelines on Cooperation between the United 
Nations and the Business Community,” July 17, 2000, accessed on November 1, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/partners/business/otherpages/guide.htm. 
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 Using critical discourse analysis to describe the creation of norms requires the researcher 
to examine both micro- and macro-level data. 21 As mentioned above, the analysis examines UN 
documents that regulate relationships with the private sector. The case study starts with systemic 
level documents because discourse strands have various discourse fragments that exist across 
discourse planes.22 To better illustrate these various discourse notions, one can imagine a large 
network. Numerous texts exist within a network, and these are the fragments. Some texts will 
contain a common, unifying topic that connects them to each other, thus starting a discourse 
strand. Such strands may exist across multiple planes or communities (i.e., the political, business, 
or scientific realms), and through the connected discourse strand some fragments may influence 
the thinking within other planes. Following this understanding, the case study identifies the UN 
and other international organizations as one discursive plane part of a larger network, which 
influences the discourse strand by starting the normalization process in knowledge development. 
Ultimately, as the case study will show through documenting how norms become established 
through this process, this allows for the construction of canals that ensure power flows in a 
certain direction. Data showcasing the nature of these relationships and how they have changed 
over time are vital for understanding the effects of increased use of PPPs to combat global food 
security problems on global governance.  
 To further reiterate the importance of discourse, it should be noted that discourses can 
“be regarded as societal means of production…[that] produce societal realities.”23 This means 
that discourse analysis aims not only to understand what already exists, but also to decipher how 
reality and the norms inherent in such reality are produced. In essence, discourse analysis allows 
for individuals to interpret the existing norms in the social world by making transparent the 
elements and forces that construct reality, and “by demonstrating that things were not always the 
way they appear now.”24 This assumes discourse strands exist in the present, past, and the future, 
and justifies exploring the entrenchment of certain discourses.25 For the purposes of this study, 
																																																								
21 Brian David Hodges, Ayelet Kuper, and Scott Reeves, “Qualitative Research: Discourse 
Analysis,” British Medical Journal 337, no. 7669 (2008): 570-572. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20510756	
22 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 47-49.  
23 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 36. 
24 Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” p. 76. 
25 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 51. 
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acknowledging the power and longevity of discourse is vital to demonstrating how norms change 
over time, eventually altering the global governance architecture.    
While discourse analysis and the methods discussed above can be useful in producing an 
exploratory or descriptive study of PPPs that sheds light on how the world is constructed and 
governed, they do have their limitations. For instance, weaknesses associated with these methods 
include their inability to verify causation, their limitation to recorded discourse, and the 
subjectivity inherent in breaking down language.26 Additionally, it is possible the original 
knowledge and meaning behind an object have significantly changed since the object’s 
conception; such readjustments may occur because of changes in power structures over an 
extended period of time (e.g., the role of churches).27 Yet, limitations such as these can be 
acknowledged upfront to mitigate concerns. And as long as caution is exercised and grandiose 
statements about the research are not made, such concerns regarding the extent of the study 
should be minimal.  
  
																																																								
26 Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research for the Social Sciences (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 
259. https://mthoyibi.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/qualitative-research-methods-for-the-social-
sciences__bruce-l-berg-2001.pdf (accessed on 2 November 2015).  
27 Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 60. 
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CHATPER 3 
REREGULATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF NORMS 
The literature informing this study is derived from critical theories that recognize the ability of 
factors such as norms and identities to explain actors’ actions.28 Norms have real effects on 
people around the globe, and are shaped by a variety of international actors, such as those in 
PPPs. To show how international norms formed by PPPs affect food security, a constructivist 
lens will be used to examine the legitimation of norms, the various types and benefits of PPPs, 
and the role corporations play in partnerships. Then, a critique of neoliberalism and the emerging 
market-state paradigm to come out of neo-liberalization efforts will take place. Before reviewing 
the literature, norms, constructivism, and a framework outlining how concepts, such as PPPs, 
become norms will be defined and discussed.  
Norms are essentially principles adhered to by actors within a system that constrain and 
shape behavior.29 They are derived from inter-subjective understandings and build over time. 
Once embedded into a social system, norms carry a sense of “ought,” which is what shapes the 
way states and non-state actors behave.30 Douglass North, who labels norms as informal 
institutional constraints that define and limit the choices of individuals, points out further that 
organizations—including political, social, economic, and educational bodies—come to exist and 
evolve according to such institutional constraints because norms determine the opportunities 
such actors can exploit.31 However, norms must be seen as legitimate if this behavioral claim is 
to be seen as true; actors seemingly comply with norms, which are not enforced per se, because 
of this reason.  
One way in which these ideas become legitimate and normalized is through continuous 
interactions among actors, ultimately forming identities and interests. Through these collective 
meanings, actors form identities, such as a sovereign state or private enterprise, which in turn 
forms interests.32 At times, such as when actors are constantly interacting with each other and 																																																								
28 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power 
politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425. 
29 Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40, 
(1996): 364.  
30 Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” p. 364. 
31 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4-7. 
32 Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 397-398. 
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they are dissatisfied with existing conditions, they can collaborate in order to create new norms.33 
Traditionally, this has been done on the international level through either the custom or treaty 
law-making processes, which establish informal and formal institutions (e.g., jus cogens and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, respectively).34 More recently though, PPPs 
provide an example of when two actors, states and private entities, meet such conditions and 
have attempted to revamp the international system through their collaboration.  
 The study of such collaboration and the resulting identities and interests falls under 
constructivist theory. According to Alexander Wendt, a leading constructivist scholar in 
international relations, “Constructivists are interested in how knowledgeable practices constitute 
subjects, which is not far from the strong liberal interest in how institutions transform identity.”35 
To be clear, identity is defined in constructivism as an understanding of the actor’s self within 
the context of collective meaning that stems from the organizing structures surrounding the 
actor.36 Similar to liberal ideology, constructivism is an advocate of the power of institutions, 
such as international cooperation formed by international arrangements like PPPs, to make 
interactions between actors less complicated by providing a forum to discuss problems, set 
regular meetings, and normalize rules and procedures.37 Understanding that these effects are the 
product of institutional constraints requires recognizing that systems are reflexive, self-
reinforcing operations crafted by the decisions and policies of those involved in creating and 
maintaining such systems.38   
 In other words, constructivists are guided by a logic of appropriateness, which operates 
under the notion that “rational actions are a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and 
norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests…in this 
																																																								
33 Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 414.  
34 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 198-202. 
35 Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 394.		
36 Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 397. 
37 Jennifer Sterling-Folkner, “Neoliberalism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 121-125. 
38 Steven L. Spiegel et al., World Politics in a New Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
49.  
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respect, norms not only constrain behavior; they also constitute the identities of actors.”39 This is 
in contrast to the individualist logic of consequences, followed by liberals and realists, where “a 
rational act is one that will produce an outcome that maximizes the interest of the individual 
unit.”40 In the developmental context, this means that constructivists will argue that development 
policies and processes are driven by values shared between policymakers that are established by 
social relationships and normative structures.41  
In examining PPPs and the norms they have helped bring about and solidify, there are 
two underlying assumptions a constructivist analysis must make. First, is that concepts, despite 
what their supporters claim, “are not politically or ideologically neutral.”42 In looking at PPPs, 
this means there are political agendas behind such relationships. Second, is that concepts change 
due to different social interpretations that happen as they are employed in different contexts.43 
Following these assumptions, a concept becomes a norm and changes the political landscape 
after it has gone through a cognitive process of knowledge development that includes three steps: 
normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation.44 
 Normalization is a “process by which international organizations help to transform a 
rough concept, initially developed in restricted circles of knowledge, into a widely accepted 
transnational norm based on expert knowledge.”45 During this step, one would see organizations 
increasingly issue statements and procedures that acknowledge the concept. For example, the 
MDGs and SDGs are a way for the United Nations to normalize PPPs. Furthermore, one would 
witness the dissemination of the idea to various actors, which leads to the second step of 
knowledge development.  
 Fragmentation is a “process by which the concept, once it has gained transnational 
prominence, is subjected to a variety of local interpretations, as it undergoes multiple uses and 																																																								
39 Karin Marie Fierke, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 190. 
40 Fierke, “Constructivism,” p, 190.  
41 Spiegel et al., World Politics, p. 380. 
42 Olivier Nay, “International Organizations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: how 
the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept,” Third World Quarterly 
35 no. 2 (2014): 211.  
43 Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 212.  
44 Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 212.  
45 Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 215.  
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acclimatizes in diverse ways across time and space.”46 Here is where one would see the idea of 
PPPs applied to several different sectors—maternal health, food security, private security, and 
more. Additionally, there might be groups, such as certain private companies or governments, 
which elect not to participate in such partnerships. This form of dissent is a way for these actors 
to show that they do not accept the validity of the notion. Once several manifestations of the 
concept have spread, the final stage of knowledge development occurs.  
 Assimilation is the third and last stage of turning a concept into a norm. It is a “process 
by which international organizations gradually revise, enrich and perpetuate hegemonic concepts 
through the steady incorporation of additional insights and critical perspectives into the 
prevailing paradigm.”47 Essentially, it is where all the ideas that materialize during fragmentation 
get either integrated into or rejected from the concept as a whole. This requires organizations to 
build networks of specialized individuals—such as scholars, experts, diplomats, etc.—to 
assimilate the knowledge. After this process is finished, the concept is not a solidified idea. 
Rather, it has become a refined concept that will continue to undergo constant adjustments to fit 
the agenda of whomever it benefits most.  
3.1 Understanding PPPs and How They Establish Corporate Norms 
3.1.1 Pubic-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
Evident by the MDGs and SDGs, the issues PPPs address are complex, cross-border 
challenges. As such, these partnerships encompass a diverse range of interests and expertise. 
Examining cooperation between the public and private sectors must take into account actors’ 
expectations. The emergence of a partnership is a sign that the formative parties share a mutual 
interest in handling the issue underpinning their collaboration.48 An issue such as food security 
demands high levels of competency and knowledge in a number of areas, and PPPs allow for the 
collaboration and cooperation of partners that include state bureaucrats and private sector 
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experts. Success, however, is dependent on stakeholders’—including citizens—equal 
participation,49 which is easier said than accomplished.  
In an attempt to foster success, different types of PPPs have emerged. One way in which 
PPPs have been categorized is as either “active” or “dependent” partnerships. 50 Active 
partnerships are built on discursive procedures including continuous negotiation, openness to 
change roles when appropriate, and learning from informational exchange. 51  Dependent 
partnerships, especially in the aid-development context, come together under specific terms, rigid 
roles, and for the purposes of furthering one partner’s interests such as gaining access to 
resources.52 Moreover, scholars have also debated whether or not partnerships are genuine 
relationships or simply rhetorical innovations.53 The former is defined by partners sharing power 
equally and mutually respecting each other, while the latter classifies partnerships as 
instrumental in re-branding policies that reinforce colonial power dynamics.54   
While PPPs may or may not just be rhetorical innovations, their focus on furthering 
partners’ interests is where the constructivist idea of reflexivity becomes apparent in the 
discussion on creating norms, identities, and interests. Once actors have solidified their identities 
they start pursuing their newfound interests, which are shaped by their identity. Underpinned by 
a mutual belief that both parties will benefit and reap advantages such as “resource availability, 
effectiveness and efficiency, and legitimacy,”55 partners’ actions start to align with their interests 
that stem from identifying as part of a partnership. Nora McKeon, food systems researcher and 
former Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) employee, expands on the assumed mutual 
benefit: 
PPPs are billed as win-win affairs since, in theory, they make it possible to profit from 
the capacities and resources of private entities and shift some of the risk of service 
provision to them while anchoring accountability solidly in the public sector. In reality, 																																																								
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accountability tends to drop out of the picture altogether while corporations manage to 
maximize their profits and evade the bulk of the risks involved in investment by pushing 
governments to twist rules and regulations to their advantage. In the field of agriculture 
and food security PPPs like those envisaged in the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition pit the interests of powerful corporations against those of peasant farmers, 
with governments too often rooting for the former.56 
 
This assumed mutual benefit framework—that connects various sectors and organizations 
together to form new, larger market mechanisms adept at reducing risk while transforming 
institutions’ identities to reflect their relationship with these new markets57—has been adopted by 
the World Bank to address poverty concerns. After redefining poverty as a less static concept, 
the Bank in its 2000-01 World Development Report labeled PPPs as a way to manage poverty 
and reduce risk by connecting and utilizing the positive aspects of public and private actors.58  
When it comes to minimalizing risk, PPPs are billed as being able to do so by reducing 
barriers to trade and lowering transaction costs through increased relations between partners. 
However, PPPs that decrease barriers tend to do so because international commercial producers 
stand to benefit much more than small domestic producers from trade liberalization. The latter 
group may not be able to sustain their livelihoods because of the new well-funded competition, 
and are forced to focus their limited resources towards whatever export crop multinational 
corporations (MNCs) are investing in—possibly leading to small producers being further 
marginalized in terms of land and resource acquisition.59 There are some that argue MNCs can 
solve this problem through contract farming, which, in theory, helps small farmers access the 
market by establishing a formal relationship wherein buyers are obligated to purchase products 
from such farmers.60 This model, however, generally creates a state of dependency for the 
farmers that can obtain one of the limited number of contracts, while other producers, primarily 
women, are left out of the scheme thus intensifying gender and economic inequalities.61 
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One of the benefits most attractive to private businesses entering into PPPs is the 
legitimacy given to the cause and the partnership due to state involvement. This legitimacy 
comes from the idea of constitutive recognition, where an actor—whether it is a state or non-
state actor—“would not possess legal personality if not recognized.” 62  Essentially, such 
recognition matters for two related reasons, which allow for private firms to expand into new 
markets unquestioned. First, is the political importance of recognition. If states or organizations 
such as the UN sanction the actions of firms by partnering with them, then such partnerships gain 
legitimacy. The second reason recognition matters is that legally it “proves that the recognizing 
states [or other actors] consider that in their view the new entity fulfills all the factual conditions 
considered necessary for becoming an international subject.”63 In other words, such recognition 
solidifies and legitimizes the role of private actors in global governance. It should be noted, 
however, that in forming legitimacy partners may have to compromise on certain perceptions, 
such as how businesses handle human rights in order to gain government trust, which in turn, as 
these new perceptions are put into operation, form new international norms.64 One norm to come 
out of this process, which emerged in response to criticisms faced by the private sector, is 
corporate social responsibility.  
3.1.2 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
The full examination of CSR is not in the scope of this study, but it is worth briefly 
discussing because it has played a role in shaping PPPs—especially partnerships formed with 
large corporations to deal with development matters (i.e., Monsanto in providing food security). 
Ramon Mullerat, former president of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of Europe, 
defines CSR as: 
A concept whereby companies voluntarily decide to respect and protect the interest of a 
broad range of stakeholders and to contribute to a cleaner environment and a better 
society through active interaction with all. CSR is the voluntary commitment by business 
to manage its role in society in a responsible way. CSR is the commitment of business to 
contribute to sustainable development working with employees, their families, [and] the 
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local communities in societies at large to improve their quality of life. CSR is cooperation 
between government, civil society and business.65 
 
Originally hailed as a way for corporations to be more socially responsibly, especially in the field 
of human rights, CSR quickly incurred many criticisms. Detractors have called CSR a deliberate 
way to appease regulators,66 a distraction from a company’s dubious activities,67 and a way for 
firms to dissociate themselves from the negative aspects of their business.68 These comments are 
grounded in the fact that CSR initiatives are voluntary, have no enforcement mechanisms, and 
seem to be nothing more than an exercise in public relations.69  
Critics of CSR initiatives have called for a new norm in the role of private enterprises 
working with governments in the form of corporate accountability. Those advocating for 
corporate accountability claim it deals with two of the biggest problems with CSR: the 
democratic deficit and inefficient regulation of business.70 Democratic deficit here refers to the 
lack of involvement of ordinary citizens in decisions made by corporations that affect them. In a 
way, this idea returns back to the active partner notion mentioned earlier; continuous, open 
discourse would benefit everyone involved with PPPs. The second idea, inefficient regulation, 
shows the dissatisfaction with businesses being able to regulate themselves. This leads to self-
beneficial policies, which is evident in the food sector.  
One form of CSR in the food industry is setting standards for companies to meet. 
Governments generally do not create these standards, but rather they come from collective 
agreements from food companies.71 Businesses willingly submit themselves to such standards 																																																								
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because they had input into its content, and, once in effect, these voluntary regulations can 
strengthen their [the private sector’s] structural power. For example, the retailers who created 
and embrace standards such as the British Retail Consortium (BRC), the Global Partnership for 
Good Agricultural Practice (Global-Gap), and the International Food Standard (IFS) can control 
and constrain market forces through such standards, and coerce suppliers to meet the demands 
required by the criterion.72 Some argue standards such as these formal certifications benefit 
farmers because it gives them greater access to markets along with confident buyers; in reality, 
however, the opportunities for suppliers to gain access to such retailers is fairly limited and 
benefits only exist for a select few.73  
The reason for allowing corporations to develop such normative frameworks is further 
advanced by two other arguments. First, corporations offer positive contributions such as capital, 
technology, and expert knowledge that will make achieving food security much easier. Second, 
by including corporations in the process of developing new norms, such firms are more likely to 
follow the rules. These positions are refutable, however, because “corporations are far more 
likely to respect norms when they are legally obligated to do so then when they are invited to 
comply voluntarily.”74 Nevertheless, once governments embrace standards such as these, societal 
norms form and the process of creating new identities and interests based on these norms starts 
again. Now that norms, constructivism, and PPPs have been defined, the discussion shall turn to 
the influence of neoliberalism and corporations on PPPs and their role in global policymaking.  
3.2 The Role of Neoliberalism and Corporations in Global Policymaking 
3.2.1 Neo-liberalization  
The liberalization of the worldwide agriculture and food industry has brought about new 
structural power for MNCs, giving them the ability to shape international norms on social and 
sustainability polices. 75  The approach taken here is to examine structural power behind 
partnerships formed by MNCs and governments that seek to provide food security in the Global 
South. The shaping of such norms falls under a process known as neo-liberalization. This process 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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is one that is focused on change—especially concerning systems such as those found in 
international politics.76 In other words, it can be categorized as the construction and consolidation 
of neoliberal ideas—notions that stress deregulation, privatization, trickle-down economics, 
personal responsibility, and the competition state77—in the forms of governance and new 
regulations.78  
 Before neoliberal ideas consolidated into governance norms, however, policies stemming 
from state-organized capitalism dominated by Keynesian ideology and characterized as the 
welfare state had to be dismantled. In the 1980s, this was done through programs that were 
guided by neoliberal notions, and the process bore the name of its leading advocates—
Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganomics the United States. Under Reagan and 
Thatcher’s leadership, the welfare state was abandoned in favor of a new model known as New 
Public Management (NPM).79 NPM sought to attract private capital and practices to completely 
run public services. When it was determined that this plan was not politically possible, PPPs 
formed as a compromise wherein the government would provide services through its employees, 
but the equipment and property was privately owned.80  
 As neoliberalism’s sole focus on rolling back regulations constraining businesses faded, 
the concept became “increasingly associated with the political foregrounding of new modes of 
‘social’ and penal policymaking, concerned specifically with the aggressive reregulation, 
disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or disposed by the neo-liberalization of the 
1980s.”81 In other words, after neoliberalism scrapped any regulations seen as hindering the 
accumulation of wealth, a process of reregulation that advocated for governments to be vassals 
of corporations tasked with ensuring the protection of private property rights began.82 Under this 
paradigm, it is important to note the reregulation process favors privatization over marketization, 
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which is to say the concern of neoliberalism in this new phase is the acquisition of public assets 
and interests by private enterprise.83  
As mentioned above, the initial phase of neo-liberalization focused on policies that 
removed regulations and furthered privatization. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) 
enacted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s had the 
explicit goal of removing state regulations from interfering with market policies. SAPs promoted 
reform in the agricultural sector aimed at reducing public sector involvement by removing grain 
reserves and eliminating subsidies for seeds and fertilizer. In Africa, this resulted in farmers 
buying cheaper, lower-yielding seeds, leading to a decline in total crop yields.84 Furthermore, 
neoliberal policies coerced countries to specialize in their so-called comparative advantage, 
which happened to be export-oriented crops.85  
While comparative advantage may work well in theory, in reality there are non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), such as import quotas, local regulations, production and export subsidies, and 
several other factors that distort prices making a pure comparative advantage impossible.86 The 
WTO is set up to remove some of these barriers, such as quotas and regulations, but goes too far 
in targeting government institutions in the Global South when the larger problem is MNCs in the 
Global North benefiting from export subsidies disguised as export credits. This is not to say that 
all subsidies are bad, considering that no “developed” country would be where it is today without 
some sort of agricultural subsidy.87 Rather, this fact demonstrates the importance of government 
support in the agricultural industry, and gives credence to the belief that policies aimed at 
dismantling public funding in the Global South are not beneficial for domestic farmers. The 
World Bank and the IMF see world trade as a level playing field, but their counsel to African 
governments to exploit their comparative advantage in raw commodities “transformed African 
countries from net food exporters to net food importers in the space of decade.”88 One reason 																																																								
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why this has happened is that the U.S. and the EU have maintained their agricultural subsidies, 
via agreements like the Blair House Accord, to maintain their market dominance rather than 
submit to the effects of liberalization.89  
In the African agricultural sector, however, the departure of the state was met with the 
opposite of neoliberal predictions: private businesses saw higher risk in projects without state 
backing and did not invest capital.90 Consequently, the few firms that did invest in countries 
under SAPs gave poor farmers unfavorable contractual conditions and were characterized as 
“rent-seeking monopolists.”91 Due to these failures, which the World Bank categorized as such in 
2008,92 the neoliberal project now understands the importance of the state in helping grow the 
private sector. The former provides vital infrastructure and assistance programs that give farmers 
access to land, credit, insurance, and links to other helpful organizations.  
3.2.2 The Market-State 
Recognizing the state as a central player for development, neoliberals now argue over 
where the positive role of the state ends.93 In turn, this has led some scholars to assert that the 
nation-state as a concept is dead, and is being superseded by an emerging market-state 
characterized by factors such as dependency on international markets and MNCs, less 
representative institutions, incentive structures rather than impartial rules and regulations, and a 
considerable accumulation of wealth.94 This model holds that states are beholden to international 
capital, as corporations are needed for jobs and economic activity; and corporations need the 
state for tax breaks, subsidies, and infrastructure.95 Hence, after the failure of SAPs, it makes 
sense to see the emergence of PPPs as a new neoliberal tool where states and corporations can 
work together to achieve corresponding agendas.  
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Neoliberalism, according to Jamie Peck, does not exist in a pure form, but rather hybrid 
variations such as PPPs advance ideological principles and constitute institutional reinvention.96 
Not only have such partnerships contributed to the creation of new metrics for global politics to 
follow by architecturally reshaping norms for international security and stability, but they are 
also establishing rigidity in their respective sectors. For example, because PPPs are more about 
firms than markets “there is not necessarily any element of market choice for the ultimate 
consumer or service user.”97 In relation to food sovereignty, this means that farmers in Ghana are 
left with fewer options when purchasing seeds.98  
Essentially, neoliberal policies have given corporations a new role in the polity where 
they have been able to consistently frame political debates around the ‘state versus market’ 
idea,99 while politicians and parties continue to be further removed from the electorate and 
financed by corporations and the extremely wealthy.100 In the United States, this paradigm is 
epitomized by the Citizens United Supreme Court case101, which represents the victory of 
corporate politics in democracy. On the other side of the Atlantic, Brussels, home of the EU 
parliament, has the second highest concentration of lobbyists outside of Washington D.C. There 
is no official data, but estimates place the number of lobbyists anywhere from 15,000 to 
30,000.102 Furthermore, about two-thirds of the lobbyists represent private interests who have 
more money and considerably larger influence than advocacy groups such as Amnesty 
International or Greenpeace.  
This has lead to a norm where members of the European Parliament (MEPs) rely on 
corporate and advocacy firms to craft legislation and amendments. In theory, this is not 
necessarily bad as groups that focus their resources and time on studying a specific topic might 																																																								
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better understand the issue at hand, therefore offering the best solution. In reality, however, 
groups are competing to have their voices and interests heard, and the entity with the most 
money can accomplish this task easier. For example, during 2011, ExxonMobil, the world’s 
wealthiest corporation, spent at least €5 million on lobbying efforts in Brussels. Whereas the 
Oxfam office for handling EU-affairs had an annual budget of €500,000 that same year.103 Thus, 
comparing such firms and saying they have equal influence in a system that requires groups to 
pay-to-play is not only erroneous, but it also demonstrates how the neoliberal paradigm has 
reshaped government into a vassal for corporate interest by allowing lobbyists, who are paid to 
find ways to further the interest (profits) of their employers, to influence legislation.  
To illustrate how conflicts of interest can arise from this situation, one can turn their 
attention to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)—the government arm of the EU 
responsible for examining risks within the region’s food supply. As one can imagine, the EFSA 
is tasked with assessing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to ensure they are safe for 
human consumption. In 2009, the EFSA received an application by Monsanto for the approval of 
a soybean with the codename MON 87701 x MON 89788. After a few years and small number 
of inquires requesting further information about tests conducted by Monsanto on the product, the 
EFSA, via its scientific panel on GMOs, deemed the soybean safe.104  This leads one to question 
what scientific panel does the EFSA contract out its GMOs inquires to that approves products for 
public consumption solely based on tests done by a corporation wishing to sell a product?  
The panel that approved Monsanto’s soybean happens to be the International Life 
Sciences Institute (ILSI), “whose mission is to provide science that improves human health and 
well-being and safeguard the environment.”105 As a PPP, it is important to examine ILSI’s 
membership and funding. To no surprise, Monsanto sits on ILSI’s Board of Trustees, and the 
organization receives more than 50 percent of its budget—$12.6 million out of $21.9 million—
from its corporate sponsors.106 This is just one of many examples where products that have only 
gone through trails paid for and conducted by corporations are being approved by government 																																																								
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commissions; the situation is only further being dominated by corporations as “tripartite 
meetings” take place between private industry groups, EU officials, and government agencies.107  
As demonstrated above, large corporations have the ability to influence bureaucracies 
located in the Global North, and turn organizations into vassals for achieving firms’ aims. As 
such, when corporations want to invest in countries in the Global South, they can employ 
governmental agencies associated with organizations such as the EU. For example, European 
officials frequently strong-arm governments in the Global South to accept free trade deals that 
better position European firms to expand into new markets. One instance showcases how Peter 
Mandleson, a European Union commissioner, had his staff write complex trade pacts, better 
known as economic partnership agreements (EPAs), for countries in the Caribbean and Africa. 
The EPAs contain clauses that do not benefit the domestic economies of the Global South. For 
example, one clause bans the taxation of raw material exports—a mechanism used to encourage 
domestic processing; another, typically known as a ‘most favored nation’ clause, stipulates that 
any trade deal given to a state that represents more than 1 percent of world trade must also be 
granted to the EU.108 Actions like these help substantiate the claim that an asymmetrical 
relationship exists between corporations and governments in the Global South. In other words, 
the former has more resources, better access to knowledge, and clear procedures, whereas the 
latter has fewer capabilities to formulate and execute coordinated, coherent policies.109  
Networks such as the ones detailed above have put PPPs at the forefront of policymaking, 
while power is increasingly being concentrated into fewer corporate hands. In effect, PPPs and 
the private firms supporting them have been able to carve out their own unregulated political 
space since “no international body mandated to monitor global corporate activity has existed 
since the UN Center for Transnational Corporations was closed down in 1992,”110 which is 
problematic considering the profit margins of many MNCs exceeds the annual GDP of the 
countries they operate in. Considering PPPs secure markets in their respective sectors for the 
involved organizations and wrap up government funding through contracts that may last twenty 
or thirty years, such partnerships create an inflexible monopoly within certain industries.111 																																																								
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Fundamentally, this means a close relationship must exist between governments and firms, 
which, in the view of neoliberals, is only acceptable if firms have influence over states.112 
Timothy Wise and Sophie Murphy describe this change in governance perfectly: 
A paradigm shift is underway, caused by the deepening integration of agricultural, 
energy, and financial markets in a resource-constrained world made more vulnerable by 
climate change. Powerful multinational firms dominate these markets. Many benefit from 
current policies and practices, and some are directly involved in new agricultural 
development programs, either through public-private partnerships or in programs such as 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. Their interests heavily influence national and 
global policies, slowing, diverting, or halting needed action. This leaves international 
institutions promoting market friendly reforms but resistant to imposing needed 
regulations on those food and agricultural markets.113 
 
In other words, the continued importance placed on such partnerships, evident by the numerous 
collaborations to stem from the MDGs and SDGs, shows the significance PPPs play in 
perpetuating the interests of those who stand to benefit from the expansion of neoliberal policies: 
corporations and international organizations associated with them.  
In this section, the neoliberal framework in which PPPs have been able to carve out their 
own unregulated political space has been discussed. As a tool where states and corporations can 
work together to achieve corresponding agendas, PPPs have worked to normalize the presence of 
the private sector in global governance. By breaking down knowledge development through the 
three-step process of normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation, this study can adequately 
show how the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles are becoming global norms. 
With the theoretical framework and literature informing this study now outlined, the next section 
will present the case study.   
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CHAPTER 4 
TURNING THE PPP CONCEPT INTO A NORM 
The case study in this paper seeks to investigate the extent to which PPPs entrench private sector 
involvement in global governance, setting a universal norm wherein private entities are at the 
forefront of global policymaking. Specifically, this is done in reference to food security. In 
exploring this question, the analysis will focus on the role of private corporations in Ghana’s 
legislative process via the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (hereafter, G8NA). 
However, it will also draw on examples from other African contexts where doing so helps to 
elaborate on the claims made. The norm creating process is examined in three different 
subsections in this chapter, each focused on one part of the knowledge creation model—
normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation—outlined in Chapter Three. Before attempting to 
connect these various nodes as part of a larger network focused on reshaping global norms, the 
term food security as it is understood here will be defined and descriptive dossiers about the key 
players in the PPP arrangement will be given. These include the Republic of Ghana; the G8NA; 
and corporate sponsors Finatrade, SABMiller, and the World Cocoa Foundation. While some 
UN documents will be examined, it is assumed that readers are familiar with the top international 
organization.  
4.1 The Terms and Actors Involved in the Analysis 
4.1.1 Food Security 
Before undertaking the analysis, it is first necessary to define the concept of food security 
given its centrality in this analysis, and to provide some background information on the context, 
that is Ghana and Africa, in which it is examined here. To begin, it should be noted that the 
definition of food security has changed over time. Originally, post-WWII, the main objective of 
the concept was to achieve freedom from hunger,114 which meant increasing production and 
yields—notions exemplified in the strategies of the Green Revolution. In 1974, the United 
Nations expanded upon the freedom from hunger idea and defined food security as the 
“availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs to sustain a steady 
expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in productions and prices.”115 By the 																																																								
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late 1990s, a new definition of food security was advanced. Influenced by numerous factors, 
including Amartya Sen’s Poverty and Famine and the rise of peasant organizations like Via 
Campesina, the FAO called for a World Food Summit (WFS) held in 1996. Those at the WFS 
agreed to a new definition of food security, which is used to this day: “Food security exists when 
all people, at all times have physical, [social], and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life.”116  
The term “social” was added in 2001 by the FAO, which essentially allows for four 
dimensions of food security to emerge: availability, access, utilization, and stability.117 The first 
dimension, availability, hinges on the term “sufficient” from the WFS definition. This leads one 
to believe that if food production can be increased, the availability of food commodities, and 
therefore food security, would also increase.118  
This is when the second dimension, access, becomes vital. When the WFS definition 
states, “all people, at all times have physical, social, and economic access…” there are three 
underlying concerns with access. First, is the physical or logistical side of having access to food; 
commodities must be close to consumers. Second, consumers must have the economic ability to 
purchase food, which means adequate amounts of food must be affordable. Finally, the social 
aspect acknowledges that socio-cultural barriers, such as food-related issues tied to HIV/AIDS, 
exist.119 These concerns, especially the social one, demonstrate how the food security paradigm 
has changed in response to alternative models such as food sovereignty (more on this later).  
 The third dimension of food security, utilization, recognizes that food security involves 
providing safe, quality food. The WFS definition embodies this notion when it reads: “safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” 
While the definition emphasizes the importance of food safety in the pursuit of ensuring food 
security, it also highlights the importance of taking into consideration people’s dietary habits 
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when selecting commodities and nutrients for societies.120 If such notions are not considered, 
then a situation where incorrect or under-utilization of food may occur, therefore preventing food 
security from being achieved.  
Stability, the last dimension of food security, is tied to the proper utilization of food. It 
focuses on making sure food security is recognized as a situation that exists when all the criteria 
of the other dimensions are met continually. The “at all times” part of the WFS definition is 
where this notion is embedded, and inherently acknowledges that food security provides a stable 
basis for continuously fighting off food insecurity.121 In the fight against food insecurity, these 
four dimensions—availability, access, utilization, and stability—have existed around globe, in 
both the past and present, in various food regimes.  
4.1.2 The Geographical Context: Africa and Ghana 
As the paper will draw primarily from developments in food security in Ghana, it is 
necessary to provide some background information on the country and the African continent. In 
2009, the number of family farms in Africa was estimated to be around 33 million, which is 80 
percent of all farms on the continent.122 In some countries these producers account for 90 percent 
of agricultural production, and meet around 80 percent of food demand mostly through invisible 
markets regulated by local customs and values.123 Peasant and small farmers serve as the 
backbone of this food supply chain and lack facilities to market their own produce, therefore 
making it harder for them to compete with imports and vulnerable to international pressures.124 
Located in West Africa, Ghana is a former British colony that gained independence in 
1957, and was ruled by several unstable military dictatorships from 1964-1992.125 After going 
through a decade-long constitutional reform process, a multi-party democracy with a parliament 
and a directly elected president was established. According to the website Freedom House, 
Ghana’s elections, both for the executive and the legislature, take place every four years. 
Elections have been deemed free and fair by international standards, and there have been 
successive peaceful transitions of power between the New Democratic Congress (NDC) and the 																																																								
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New Patriotic Party (NPP). While Ghanaians enjoy many civil liberties such as freedom of the 
press, freedom of religion, and open political participation, corruption still exists. For example, 
bureaucratic agents are known for taking bribes, and the police have a history of using excessive 
force, illegally detaining civilians, and setting up illegal checkpoints to demand money for 
passage. Additionally, women are underrepresented in politics—only securing 30 of 275 
parliamentary seats in 2012—and in some rural areas subjected to female genital mutilation.126  
As one of the more free states in Africa, Ghana has been a flagship country for world 
economic reform on the continent.127 Today, the country is well known for its cocoa and gold 
industries, and for being the birthplace of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 128 
According to the website for Ghana’s Embassy in Washington D.C., Ghana currently has a 
population estimated above 25 million people representing about seventy-five ethnic groups, 
with a plurality belonging to the Akan group (47.5%). Christians make up the majority (71.2%) 
of the population; other parts of the populace identify as practicing Islam (17.6%), traditional 
faiths (5.2%), none (5.2%), and other (0.8%). Additionally, the literacy rate of the total 
population is 71.5 percent, with males (78.3%) having a higher rate than females (65.3%).129  
Within Ghana’s relatively diverse population, issues of malnutrition cut across 
demographics with as many as 1.2 million Ghanaians considered food insecure.130 And while 
Ghana has made progress reducing its poverty rate from 52 percent to 28 percent since the 
inception of the MDGs, problems that stem from nutritional deficiencies, a condition correlated 
with poverty, still exist.131 For example, in 2011 the prevalence of anemia in children was 57 
percent, 23 percent of children 0-59 months of age experienced stunned growth, and 13 percent 
of children in the same age group were underweight.132 In order to progress nutritionally, Ghana 
has joined several food-related international programs: the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) 
Movement, the African-led Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), 																																																								
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the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), and, the initiative analyzed in this case 
study, the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.133  
4.1.3 Food Regimes and the G8NA 
The drive to ensure food security has resulted in a variety of food governance regimes at 
the global level. The food regime concept refers to “the political structuring of world capitalism, 
and its organization of agricultures to provision labor and/or consumers in such a way as to 
reduce wage costs and enhance commercial profits.”134 In the past 150 years, three food regimes 
have been identified. The first existed from the 1870s-1930s, when Great Britain linked its 
industrial zones to cheap food zones associated with British colonial rule.135 Settler states, areas 
Britain had formally colonialized and had strong ties to, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
and the United States, provided cheap imports of wheat and meat.136 While Britain’s colonial ties 
in Asia and Africa allowed for these areas to specialize in tropical export crops that seemingly 
gave them a comparative advantage. 137  These two agricultural zones supported British 
industrialization and allowed for Britain to maintain hegemony in the world market, and 
simultaneously expanded farming and crop production in the settler and colonial states.  
The second regime—which like the first was state dominated, except by the United States 
instead of Great Britain—prevailed during the 1940s-1970s, and focused on empowering the 
agro-industrial model.138 Known as the Green Revolution, the focus shifted to producing higher 
crop yields with the help of science and technology. As U.S. President Harry Truman stated in 
1949: “Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production 
is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.”139 The 
abundance of food produced through the application of such knowledge allowed for U.S. 																																																								
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exports, such as wheat and soy, to dominate international markets and weaken domestic 
producers in countries that imported cheap American crops—making some states in the Global 
South dependent on food imports.140 This second regime paved the way for the final and current 
food regime. 
This third regime is centered on free market principles, transnational finance and 
commodities, and the consolidation of corporate interests.141 Labeled the corporate food regime 
by the academics that identified the first two regimes, this arrangement allows for corporations to 
achieve high levels of profit from food production and control the global food market.142 
Corporations are able to achieve market dominance through measures such as influencing 
government legislation, which fits under the parameters of neo-liberalization, the market-state 
paradigm, and David Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession” notion. 143  In addition to 
advocating the liberalization of markets and the privatization of public assets, the corporate food 
regime is ecologically destructive as it relies heavily on fossil fuels, leads to the degradation of 
soil and destruction of biodiversity, and diminishes the importance of traditional knowledge and 
practices in favor of specialized industrial farming.144 
The current architecture of food security governance is fragmented and no real 
commanding governance structure exists under the corporate food regime. Due to this void, 
quasi-regulatory entities, such as PPPs, have expanded resulting in corporate-led programs found 
in initiatives such as the G8NA.145 Founded in 2012, the G8NA seeks to bring together the 
resources and abilities of G8 governments, African countries, and private firms to uplift fifty 
million Africans out of poverty by 2022.146 The other goals of the initiative, as outlined on the 
G8NA website, are:  
• Reaffirm continued donor commitment to reducing poverty and hunger.  
• Accelerate implementation of key components of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme.  																																																								
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• Leverage the potential of responsible private investment to support development goals.  
• Achieve sustained inclusive, agriculture-led growth in Africa.147  
To achieve these goals, businesses—or stakeholders as they are referred to on the G8NA 
website—and individual African countries negotiate what are known as Cooperation 
Frameworks.148 Within these agreements, African host countries essentially agree to create 
investment-friendly environments to attract foreign direct investment, while private firms pledge 
resources to further food security.149 To ensure the proper implementation of Cooperation 
Frameworks and that all sides are upholding their end of the deal, G8 countries serve as 
interlocutors tasked with providing financial and capacity-building support; the United States is 
the interlocutor in charge of G8NA affairs in Ghana.150 The agreement between Ghana and its 
stakeholders will be examined later in the case study. 
 For countries like the United States, with large agricultural firms, the G8NA is viewed as 
a win-win situation that helps small entrepreneurs by giving them access to new technology and 
seed varieties, and at the same time opens up Africa—the “last frontier”—to global agriculture 
markets.151 Since its conception, however, many groups have criticized the G8NA. For instance, 
as McKeon notes:  
Initiatives like the G8’s ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ and ‘Grow Africa’ 
program promoted by the World Economic Forum, clothed in language of fighting hunger, 
aim at privatizing Africa’s natural resources, opening up its agrifood markets to corporations, 
and institutionalizing an industrial model of agriculture along with value chains that whisk 
benefits away form rural economies.152 
 
Other organizations, such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), the 
Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance (EAA), and the ONE Campaign, also have concerns about the 
G8NA that can be condensed into the following risks:  
• “Increasing the concentration of land and land grabbing. 
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• Encouraging the pursuit of large-scale models of production, which are focused on 
monocultures and pose severe environmental consequences, including soil degradation, 
amongst other issues. 
• Focusing on export-oriented crops or most lucrative markets which could leave farmers at 
the mercy of volatile international commodity prices. 
• Facilitating unpredictable and poorly remunerated seasonal labour through contract 
farming schemes. 
• Encouraging the consolidation of power in input markets. 
• Propagating a loss of agro-biodiversity, particularly where seeds are concerned. 
• Reducing impetus from States to act on public commitments to food and nutrition 
security, in that way relegating the task to corporate actors.”153  
In summary, corporations are leading the way in consolidating and gaining control of the market 
in Africa, and initiatives like the G8NA are transforming the state and its institutions into vassals 
for large firms. 
4.1.4 Corporate Dossiers 
The corporations involved with Ghana via the G8NA include both domestic and 
multinational firms. Since this case study focuses largely on Ghana’s Plant Breeders Bill, dubbed 
by some as the “Monsanto Law,”154 (the reason for the label is explained later), only the 
businesses connected to the agro-seed industry shall be discussed. This network starts with three 
firms that have pledged to support G8NA aims in Ghana: Finatrade Group, SABMiller, and the 
World Cocoa Foundation. The first business, Finatrade, is a Ghanaian company that works with 
large MNCs—including ABInBev, Beiersdorf, and Coca-Cola—to “bring the world’s products 
to West African consumers, and West African products to the world.”155 In other words, 
Finatrade is focused on obtaining, processing, and distributing commodities. Additionally, it is 
worth noting that in Ghana’s Cooperation Framework it states Finatrade and its subsidiaries 
“sourced a combined volume of 660,000 metric tons in 2011 across four agricultural 
commodities—cocoa, cashew nut, sugar, and rice—and is currently looking to expand into maize 																																																								
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and soya.”156 Sourcing volumes in quantities this large is significant because agricultural 
production in these fields is highly consolidated. For example, as the world’s second largest 
cocoa producer—Ghana’s estimated 2014 cocoa bean output was 930,000 metric tons—a dozen 
local companies, Finatrade being one, accounted for 98 percent of bean purchases.157  
 The second company to detail is SABMiller. A top-twenty Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) company, this London-based firm is one of the largest brewers in the world 
employing around 69,000 individuals across more than eighty countries, and reporting revenue 
of around $26 billion for 2015.158 SABMiller was selected as a corporate sponsor in Ghana for 
two reasons. First, the company supports local farming in Africa with “estimates that its local 
sourcing programmes support 89,000 farming jobs in Africa (excluding South Africa).”159 
Second, SABMiller’s subsidiary Accra Brewery Ltd., located in Ghana, seeks to brew more 
cassava-based lagers and expand cassava growing and processing in the region.160 Together, 
these two reasons signify SABMiller’s willingness to be a corporate sponsor, as the benefits 
from doing so would result in a more regulation-friendly environment in the cassava industry.     
 Before moving forward, it is worth noting that Finatrade and SABMiller are connected to 
ABInBev, the world’s largest brewer that reported revenue of around $43 billion in 2015.161 As 
mentioned above, ABInBev is one of Finatrade’s suppliers. The connection between SABMiller 
and ABInBev, however, is much deeper than just partners. In 2015, it was announced that the 
two brewers would merge into a new conglomerate valued at £71 billion controlling around 30 
percent of the beer market.162  This has major ramifications for SABMiller’s involvement in 
Ghana’s Cooperation Framework, especially in relation to the seed industry because of 
ABInBev’s collaboration with Syngenta—a Swiss biotech company. The beer giant is working 																																																								
156 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, “G8 Cooperation Framework to Support The 
‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ in Ghana,” 2012, p. 8, accessed May 13, 2016, 
https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Ghana_web.pdf. 
157 Ecobank, “Middle Africa Briefing Note: Cocoa,” p. 1, accessed August 17, 2016, 
http://www.ecobank.com/upload/20140723100236691535ay7ctp5kPP.pdf. 
158 “Who We Are,” SABMiller, accessed May 13, 2016, http://www.sabmiller.com/about-
us/who-we-are. 
159 New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana,” p. 12. 
160 New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana,” p. 12. 
161 Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2015 Annual Report, p. 49, accessed May 13, 2016, 
http://annualreport.ab-inbev.com/docs/2015_Annual_Report/2015-Annual-Report-ENG.pdf. 
162 Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2015 Annual Report, p. 48. 
 	
35 
with the Syngenta “to secure the sourcing of high-quality malting barely, the key raw material 
for the beer industry.” 163 ABInBev’s suppliers account for about one-fifth of the world’s planted 
malting barley meaning the deal between ABIbBev and SABMiller would increase this 
percentage and create a larger market for Syngenta’s genetically modified barley variations, 
which are already being used by 160 farmers on 14,000 hectares in Argentina.164 In theory, this 
means SABMiller could use its G8 sponsorship to push for the creation of regulations that would 
allow for the introduction and market domination of Syngenta’s barley seeds in Ghana.   
 The final corporate partnership to be detailed is with the World Cocoa Foundation 
(WCF). The WCF styles itself as: 
…an international membership organization that promotes sustainability in the cocoa 
sector by providing cocoa farmers with the support they need to grow more quality cocoa 
and strengthen their communities. Representing more than 80 percent of the global cocoa 
market, WCF’s programs benefit farmers in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Americas.165  
 
As a large organization, the WCF has both members and partners. Its members include 
companies such as The Hersey Company, Kellogg’s, Mars Incorporated, Nestlé, Starbucks, and 
many others.166 The WCF’s partners, which are seen as vital to optimizing knowledge and 
maximizing benefits, include a diverse number of entities including the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the European Union, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), The 
Germany Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the University of Wisconsin, U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Walmart Foundation, and the World Bank.167 Between 
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it and its partners, the WCF pledged $3.8 million towards the G8NA with the goal of doubling 
the productivity of the 35,000 cocoa farmers in Ghana, Côté d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and Nigeria.168  
 It is no surprise that the WCF is partnered with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, a 
giant in the field of developmental aid. While the Gates Foundation may do impressive 
humanitarian work, such as leading the effort in micro-saving to help uplift people from the 
poverty trap,169 this does not mean the Foundation does not have other than charitable motives. 
As the largest philanthropic organization in the world, the Gates Foundation has given money to 
several initiatives including, in 2006, $150 million to the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA).170 On the surface this donation may be viewed as helping combat food 
insecurity, but a deeper analysis of AGRA and why the money was given to the organization 
leads one to question Gate’s motives. While it has been documented that India currently 
produces more food in the aggregate-sense because of initiatives like AGRA, the measures 
enacted also pushed farmers into debt,171 which subsequently was followed by an increase in 
farmer suicide, further environmental degradation, and a reduced variety of crops in the Punjab 
region from 250 to just three monocultures of wheat, rice, and cotton.172 
 This type of agriculture reform, one that is focused on increasing monoculture outputs to 
provide food security, fits within the food security paradigm portrayed by the FAO. It also fits 
with Bill Gates’ personal ideology, which he outlined in his 2009 annual letter: “New seeds and 
other inputs like fertilizer allow a farmer to increase her farm’s output significantly, instead of 
just growing enough food to subsist. This innovation is just as important as developing and 
delivering vaccinations. The additional output means her children get better nutrition, which 
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improves their health and ability to learn.”173 While Gates’ optimism about technology and its 
ability to improve the livelihood of millions of Africans by ensuring they have enough food is 
based on historical precedents in other parts of the world, it also happens to align with Gate’s 
financial interests. For example, related to the G8NA in Ghana, the Gates Foundation is known 
to have donated $23 million to the WCF in 2009174 and another $10 million in 2014.175 While on 
the surface this may seem like a philanthropic, altruistic gift, like the $150 million given to 
AGRA, there is also a financial motive in it for the Foundation.  
Between these donations, in 2010, it was revealed the Gates Foundations’ investment 
portfolio contained 500,000 shares of Monsanto—an agrochemical and biotechnology 
behemoth—estimated to be worth around $23 million, and that the Foundation was teaming up 
with agribusiness giant Cargill in a $10 million soybean project in Mozambique.176 So, if the 
WCF is successful in its goal of doubling the productivity of cocoa farmers in Ghana by 
increasing their access to productivity inputs such as new seed varieties and fertilizers, than 
Gates, and Monsanto and Cargill by association, will have created a whole new market 
dependent on their products. This, in turn, means more money for the agrochemical industry and 
its stakeholders. Bear in mind, “six multinationals—Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, 
and BASF—control 75 percent of all private sector plant breeding research, 60 percent of the 
commercial seed market and 76 percent of global agrochemical sales.”177 
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4.2 From Concept to Norm 
Now that the actors involved in this case study have been described, the present section will 
analyze the relevant documents to show the process by which the concept of PPP has become a 
norm. It will trace its evolution from the normalization phase to that of fragmentation, and finally 
to assimilation. Following the case study is a chapter offering a look at an alternative to food 
security, and some concluding thoughts about the information presented here are given.  
4.2.1 Normalization of PPPs: From the Top-down 
The first step of a concept or idea becoming a norm is normalization, which occurs when 
an idea becomes ubiquitous because of increased use by international organizations. As 
discussed in the introduction of this paper, Goal 8 of the MDGs was the initial push by the 
world’s largest international organization, the United Nations, to normalize PPPs, which was 
followed in 2015 by Goal 17 of the SDGs. In 2000, it became clear the UN would need private 
partners to finance and achieve the MDGs, so the Office of the Secretary-General encouraged 
UN member states to cooperate with businesses by releasing a document titled “Guidelines on 
Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Community.”  
In this document, the Secretary-General immediately recognizes the importance of the 
business community in Point 3: “The relationship with the business community has become 
more important as the role of business in generating employment and wealth through trade, 
investment and finance has grown and as UN member states have increasingly stressed the 
importance of private investment in development.”178 In Point 4, the Secretary-General goes on 
to mention how UN activities such as “promoting peace and security, providing norms and 
standards in such diverse areas as trade laws, shipping, aviation, telecommunication, postal 
services and statistics; addressing issues of vulnerability, poverty, environmental degradation and 
social conflict,” are seen as “helping provide a stable and favourable framework for business and 
development.”179 
These two points push an agenda centered on private investment in two ways. First, with 
the line “UN member states have increasingly stressed the importance of private investment in 
development,” the document is putting forth a narrative that development programs can no 
longer be solely funded by states. In turn, this means that states need to do what they can to 																																																								
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attract private capital to be invested in their development programs. Second, concerning the 
discourse from Point 4, if UN activities are seen as “helping provide a stable and favourable 
framework for business and development,” then the organization and its member states are 
essentially relegating themselves to being in the service of corporations, rather than the converse. 
While non-state actors such as large corporations may be helpful in achieving UN aims, the UN 
is ultimately responsible to its member states, and by association, the citizens of said states. 
Therefore, it should not be the organization’s concern to establish frameworks that favor MNCs 
and allow for some citizens’ livelihoods to be decided by private interests.  
The Secretary-General’s guidelines address this concern, but only vaguely. Point 14 
discusses general requirements that all UN cooperative arrangements should follow. The first 
subsection states: “The objective [of partnerships] needs to be articulated clearly and must 
advance UN goals as laid out in the Charter.”180 Further general principles are laid out in 
subsequent subsections:  
 b) Clear delineation of responsibilities and roles: The arrangement must be based on a 
clear understanding of respective roles and expectations, with accountability and a clear 
division of responsibilities. c) Maintain integrity and independence: Arrangements should 
not diminish the UN's integrity, independence and impartiality.181 
 
There are inherent problems with these guidelines. The notion that “arrangement[s] must be 
based on a clear understanding of respective roles and expectations with…a clear division of 
responsibilities,” creates dependent partnerships characterized by specific terms and rigid roles, 
rather than active partnerships built on continuous negotiation and the ability to adapt from 
informational exchange.182 
 Furthermore, the idea that partnerships “should not diminish the UN’s integrity, 
independence and impartiality,” is nearly impossible. Due to the nature of partnerships, by 
entering into an arrangement the UN, or any member state, is effectively ceding over some of its 
autonomy to the other partner, and is endorsing whatever discourse and/or paradigm associated 
with the partnership. This is certainly the case in regards to partnerships formed to combat food 
insecurity that rely heavily on technological innovations controlled by corporations, which, in the 
view of small producers that favor the food sovereignty paradigm, eliminates the impartiality of 																																																								
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the state(s) and/or international organization(s) partaking in such agreements. Now that the 
normalization of PPPs has been discussed, specifically its use by international organizations, the 
case study shall turn its focus to the fragmentation of the concept by examining multiple 
interpretations of the concept offered by different international actors.   
4.2.2 Fragmentation of PPPs: A State Analysis 
The second phase of movement from concept to norm involves fragmentation. As 
discussed earlier in the literature review, PPPs are arrangements billed as win-win affairs that 
minimalize risk, lower transaction costs, and allow for the public and private sectors to share 
resources and expertise to tackle immense challenges. Formed in various contexts uniquely 
developed to specific sectors, “PPPs differ significantly from sector to sector and from project to 
project.”183 This observation demonstrates how the concept of PPPs is still going through the 
fragmentation stage of knowledge development, wherein the notion has gained international 
prominence and is acclimatized in multiple areas of space and time. In order to show how this 
stage helps to further entrench the private sector as a global governance leader, this section of the 
case study shall review multiple, diverse cases of PPPs in wider context beyond food security. 
Examining how the PPP concept has been institutionalized in different states will demonstrate 
the fragmentation of the concept, which is needed to show the progression from an idea to an 
established norm. A country-by-country analysis demonstrates fragmentation best as individual 
states engage the PPP concept differently, while each state’s institutions provide the concept with 
legitimacy that eventually moves the concept into the assimilation phase of norm creation.   
 Starting on the country level, the first case to examine is the United States. Concerning 
infrastructure projects alone—those that deal with railroads, highways, bridges airports, etc.—the 
United States had 104 PPPs between 1989 and 2011.184 The majority (56%) of these projects 
took place in one of five states: California, Colorado, Florida, Texas, and Virginia. In addition, it 
is worth noting 82 percent of transportation PPPs contracted within this timeframe are located in 
the United States’ top 100 metropolitan areas, meaning the demand for such services corresponds 																																																								
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to higher demand for transportation services.185 While data suggest PPPs and their adoption are 
growing in the U.S., other areas, such as Asia and Europe, have invested heavily in the concept. 
As the authors of one study note, with little federal direction and various standards between 
individual states, “there is a lack of institutional capacity and expertise in some cities and states 
to properly promote the benefits and costs of PPP deals.”186 It should be pointed out the discourse 
used by the authors is a critique of the lack of capacity and calls for further implementation of 
PPPs to achieve certain “benefits,” which follows the ideology behind neo-liberalization and 
helps to establish the PPP concept as a norm.   
 It may also be useful to acknowledge that PPPs exist differently in various institutional 
structures. For example, governments may choose to house their PPP management units in a 
certain ministry or even formalize the unit as a public corporation, as is the case in the United 
Kingdom and Canada, respectively. In the United Kingdom, the unit that provides technical 
advice to and is in charge of domestic PPPs is known as Infrastructure UK (IUK), and is housed 
in Her Majesty’s Treasury.187 Formed in 2010, IUK consolidated Partnership UK and the U.K. 
Treasury’s PPP Policy Team, and now, as of 1 January 2016, IUK has merged with the Major 
Projects Authority (MPA) to create the new Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA).188 This 
means the IPA engages with numerous actors on policies ranging from housing and 
transportation to information technology and education, and seeks to provide technical expertise 
and state direction to private entities by helping companies structure competitive bids and design 
quality assurance systems.189 
 Similarly, the PPP unit in Ghana, the Public Investment Division (PID), is housed in the 
government’s Ministry of Finance. In recent years, Ghana’s government has recognized PPPs as 
a way to procure foreign investment to finance and expand public infrastructure, and received 
$30 million USD from the World Bank to build up a comprehensive PPP program from 2012-
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2016. 190 To implement such policies, the government developed the National Policy on PPP, 
which, spearheaded by PID, looks to develop “the legal, institutional and regulatory framework 
for the PPP Programme.”191 Since this case study examines Ghana’s Plant Breeders Bill, it is 
worth highlighting the language used by PID when it comes to regulatory legislation for private 
investors.  
Phase One of the PPP Programme looks at facilitating private sector involvement in 
Ghana by improving capacities of such organizations through establishing regulatory 
frameworks through legislative and institutional means.192 As PID states, legislation regarding 
PPPs should “provide sufficient protection to lenders, such as step in rights,193 security over 
assets, foreign currency transfers, property rights, rights to award concessions, etc.” 194 
Furthermore, PID lists two key objectives of the PPP Programme: “Ensure attainment of required 
and acceptable local and international social and environmental standards, [and] protect the 
interests of all stakeholders including end users, affected people, Government and the private 
sector.”195 The first statement clearly seeks to provide MNCs with property rights and any other 
rights companies label as “sufficient protection” before investing in Ghana. The second 
statement, when it says a key objective is attaining “acceptable local and international social and 
environmental standards,” can also be a way to usher in regulatory frameworks suited to 
corporations. As discussed earlier in the literature review, many international standards, such as 
the International Food Standard, allow large companies to control market forces by constraining 
and coercing suppliers to meet such demands.196 From the documentation provided by PID, it 
seems Ghana’s Ministry of Finance is looking to establish PPP-friendly frameworks by giving 
corporations what they want.  																																																								
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 Returning back to the fragmentation of the PPP concept, that is, how states adapt and 
institutionalize PPPs to different contexts, some states, such as Canada, elect to form their PPP 
unit as a corporation. Compared to housing a PPP unit in a ministry as in the British case, setting 
one up as a public or crown corporation allows the unit greater political independence, more 
flexibility when it comes to the PPP market, and makes the unit accountable to the private sector 
through an independent Board of Directors run by private sector citizens.197 In 2008, the 
Canadian government established PPP Canada, a crown corporation, to work with public 
authorities at every level—provincial, territorial, municipal, and national—and provide 
competitive funding for public infrastructure projects on a variety of topics including broadband 
connectivity, culture, energy, security, transportation, and tourism.198 While PPP Canada cannot 
impose federal standards for PPP engagement, it does provide technical assistance and education 
about PPPs to both government agencies and private entities interested in entering such 
arrangements. Additionally, the crown corporation serves as the first reviewer for projects 
submitted to the New Building Canada Fund administered by Infrastructure Canada.199 
 Besides being institutionalized differently, PPPs vary across sectors. Partnerships 
arranged by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
illustrate this point. One reason for this is because the number of private partners working with 
UNESCO, since the introduction of the MDGs in 2000, “has increased to several hundred, 
ranging from multinational companies, to small and medium sized enterprises, philanthropic 
trusts and foundations, economic and business associations and individuals.”200 To show sectorial 
fragmentation, brief examples from the different sectors UNESCO works in will be given.  
 The first example is in the field of education. In the Balkans, UNESCO works with 
Hewlett-Packard to help alleviate the brain drain experienced in the region by providing better 
grid computing technology for universities, assisting researchers access international 
information, and supplying financial assistance for scientific research done by young 
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professionals.201 The second example comes from the natural sciences, and works towards 
achieving the MDG focused on reducing the gender gap. Working alongside cosmetics giant 
L’Oréal, UNESCO has developed a tiered program that recognized the work of female scientist 
around the globe by awarding fellowships up to $100,000 USD.202 Finally, concerning culture 
and the environment, UNESCO’s World Heritage Foundation is partnered with the Shell 
Foundation, an arm of oil company Royal Dutch Shell, to pair Shell Group and World Heritage 
site mangers together to develop and implement better business practices.203 Each of these 
partnerships works towards facilitating cooperation and stability in their respective sectors, while 
also promoting global integration through public and private means.  
 While discussing UNESCO’s partnerships, the discourse concerning the private sector 
used by former UNESCO Assistant Director General for external Relations and Cooperation 
Ahmed Sayyad should be analyzed. Mr. Sayyad, when speaking on the difference such 
partnerships can make, wrote:  
UNESCO and the private sector now work together by sharing resources and expertise to 
develop partnership programmes. These programmes promote advocacy, enhance policy 
dialogue, build international rules and norms [emphasis added], harness markets for 
development, and carry out projects that contribute directly to tackling global challenges, 
achieving wide reach and great impact…They also make good long-term business sense 
by positioning the private sector and, in particular, the business community as key drivers 
of sustainable development.204  
 
Mr. Sayyad’s comments speak to two major points of this thesis. First, as emphasized above, he 
acknowledges the ability of PPPs to reshape and “build international rules and norms.” Not only 
does this recognize the fact that global governance norms are changing, but it also highlights that 
international organizations understand and help facilitate such structural remodeling. Secondly, 
Mr. Sayyad’s comments about PPPs being “good long-term” investments for the business 
community fits within the neo-liberalization framework. Through these arrangements, private 
entities can enter into decades-long government contracts and create new markets in the Global 
South, thus generating stable long-term profit projections.  
 This section of the case study has shown how PPPs are institutionalized differently by 																																																								
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various states, and utilized across an assortment of sectors. As the concept is fragmented across 
these diverse situations, it becomes further refined and familiar within the international 
community. This is vital for the creation of a PPP-norm since this process adds legitimacy to the 
idea, which is needed if international actors, especially non-state actors such as corporations, are 
going to subject themselves to the constraints and limitations of the PPP framework. Once 
several manifestations of the concept have spread, the final stage of knowledge development, 
known as assimilation, occurs.  
4.2.3 Assimilation of PPPs: The G8’s New Alliance 
Assimilation, the last step of knowledge development, is when a concept is further 
revised by incorporating additional insights and perspectives into the notion through a specific 
field or paradigm. This requires the organization(s) undertaking such a task to build networks of 
specialized individuals—such as scholars, experts, diplomats, private sector citizens, etc.—that 
comprehend the concept and are willing to work within its established framework. Here, the case 
study examines the assimilation of the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles 
through the specific paradigm of food security. It does this by examining the parameters of 
partnerships formed under the G8NA’s Cooperation Frameworks in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Ghana, though the primary focus is on Ghana and how the G8 initiative acted as a catalyst for 
neoliberal aims such as securing favorable manufactures’ rights through legislation like Ghana’s 
Plant Breeders Bill. The Cooperation Frameworks in Ethiopia and Tanzania are reviewed and 
compared alongside Ghana’s Cooperation Framework for assimilation purposes due to the fact 
that large companies such as Monsanto, SABMiller, and Syngenta are all directly or indirectly 
involved in each agreement.205  
 Ghana’s Cooperation Framework opens with a commitment made by the Government of 
Ghana and G8 member nations. It states that the involved parties: 
…commit to the ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ and to working together 
to generate greater private investment in agricultural development, scale innovation, 
achieve sustainable food security outcomes, reduce poverty and end hunger…The G8 
members intend to provide support within the agricultural sector…with the overall goal 
of facilitating increases in private investment and scaling innovation [emphasis added]. 
The G8 members intend to engage the relevant agencies of their member governments 
and also to bring to bear appropriate enabling actions to accelerate progress in the areas 
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of finance and markets, science and technology, and risk management.206 
 
The commitments made here by both the Government of Ghana and G8 member states are 
concerned more with securing capital for agricultural investment than helping small producers 
increase supply. The above discourse, along with PID’s PPP Programme, demonstrates that 
creating attractive investment environments takes precedence over building up small producers’ 
capacity in two ways. First, when it lists the general commitments made by the involved parties, 
the first collaborative notion mentioned is “to generate greater private investment in agricultural 
development.” This is listed before commitments to “achieve sustainable food security 
outcomes, [and] reduce poverty and end hunger,” showing the G8NA’s preference for creating a 
business-friendly environment before devoting time and resources to achieving sustainable food 
policies and frameworks that work towards reducing food insecurity.  
 Granted, one can argue, if they share Bill Gates’ optimism about technology’s ability to 
improve the livelihood of millions of Africans through innovations in seeds and fertilizer, 
generating and securing private investment in agricultural development is paramount to 
achieving food security. However, when the commitments section continues by doubling down 
on the importance of attracting private capital by saying, “G8 members intend to provide support 
within the agricultural sector…with the overall goal of facilitating increases in private 
investment and scaling innovation [emphasis added],” one is given reason to pause because so 
much focus is being put on private sector incorporation over domestic, food-related issues. 
Additionally, this language, word-for-word, is used in the opening commitments of Ethiopia’s 
Cooperation Framework207 and Tanzania’s Cooperation Framework.208  
Further attention is paid to investing in private agricultural development under the Key 
Policy Commitments section in all three Cooperation Frameworks. Ghana’s agreement states:  
The Government of Ghana intends to pursue the policy goals set out below in order to 
build domestic and international private sector confidence to increase agricultural 
investment significantly, with the overall goal of reducing poverty and ending hunger. 																																																								
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The Government of Ghana intends to improve incentives for private sector investment in 
agriculture, in particular, taking actions to facilitate inclusive access to and productive 
use of land; developing and implementing domestic seed regulations that encourage 
increased private sector involvement in this area [emphasis added]; and supporting 
transparent inclusive, evidence-based policy formulation.209 
 
Ethiopia and Tanzania’s Cooperation Frameworks have the exact same discourse stating their 
governments’ intention to focus on “developing and implementing domestic seed policies that 
encourage increased private sector involvement in this area.”210 Alone, the attention to this issue 
across Cooperation Frameworks provides evidence that the PPP concept and its associated 
neoliberal principles are being assimilated and advanced through the G8NA. The specifics of 
each country’s Key Policy Agreements, however, suggest an entrenchment of the private sector 
in global governance that follows the market-state paradigm where governments work to 
advance the interests of corporations.  
 In Ethiopia’s Cooperation Framework, the first objective outlined in the Government of 
Ethiopia’s Key Policy Commitments is to: “Increase private sector participation in seed 
development, multiplication, and distribution.”211 One of the objectives in Tanzania’s Key Policy 
Commitments reads: “Develop and implement domestic and regional seed and other inputs 
policies that encourage greater private sector participation in the production, marketing and trade 
in seeds and other inputs.”212 And Ghana’s Cooperation Framework contains one particular 
objective for the government to: “Establish policy that enables the private sector to develop, 
commercialize, and use improved inputs to increase smallholder productivity and incomes.”213 
One should note how each of these objectives seeks to incentivize private sector involvement in 
the agriculture sector by emboldening private entities through the establishment of business-
friendly regulations.  
The G8NA, in an attempt to measure the success of partnership goals the above-
mentioned objectives, recommends certain actions be fulfilled by specific dates. For example, in 
the Ethiopian Framework, one suggested action advocates for establishing regulatory changes 																																																								
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such as allowing market forces to more freely determine the price and availability of seeds by 
June 2012.214 Tanzania’s agreement lists several actions related to the seed industry including 
one calling for “taxes on seeds and seed packaging [be] reduced or lifted by July 2013.”215 
Lastly, the policy actions recommended for Ghana call for sweeping reforms:  
1. Regulations developed to implement the new seed law [by June 2013], specifically: 
• Seed registry system established. 
• Protocols for variety testing, release and registration, authorization to 
conduct field inspections, seed sampling, and seed testing developed. 
• Standards for seed classification and certification established. 
2. New agricultural input policy for fertilizer and certified seed use developed [by 
December 2013] that includes: 
• Clearly defined role of government in fertilizer and seed marketing; 
• Clearly defined role of government’s CSIR and Grains & Legumes Board; 
and 
• Defined role of private sector in breeding.216 
 
These actions, in accordance with the commitments previously outlined, aim to improve 
incentives for private companies, specifically large agriculture and biotech firms, to invest in 
each country’s agriculture sector. In Ghana, such actions are included in the yet to be passed 
2013 Plant Breeders Bill, which, if ever implemented, would constitute the type of institutional 
reinvention that establishes private sector dominance of governance.  
The Plant Breeders Bill, also commonly referred to as the ‘Monsanto Law’ by reporters, 
provides reason to question and explore the connections to private sector entities that have an 
economic interest in such market development. It provides such a basis because the language 
contained within the bill heavily favors private companies over agricultural producers and even 
the government itself. For example, Section 23 of the Bill reads: “A plant breeder right shall be 
independent of any measure taken by the Republic to regulate within Ghana the production, 
certification and marketing of material of a variety or the importation or exportation of the 
material.” In other words, the Bill is trying to preempt any future government regulations that 
may restrict the sale of agricultural products. The regulations could be for environmental or 
health reasons, but if this Bill is passed then the government would not have to authority to 
“regulate within Ghana the production, certification and marketing of material of a variety or the 																																																								
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importation or exportation of the material.”  
In several other sections, the Bill also provides protections for breeders, defined in 
Section 61 as “(a) the person who bred, or discovered and developed a variety; (b) the employer 
of the person referred to in paragraph (a); or (c) the successor in title of the persons referred to in 
paragraphs (a) or (b).” One protection, found in Section 8.2.b, is an attempt to preempt state 
regulations on corporate breeders that have applied for and been denied rights on a variety in a 
foreign county. To illustrate, say the European Union or another African state bans a product, 
companies will be still be able to register for plant breeder rights in Ghana because Section 8.2.b 
prevents the Registrar from denying a breeder’s application on such grounds. Not only does this 
reduce the autonomy of the government, but also it dissuades officials from relying on scientific 
studies conducted by other states that may be imperative to understanding the varieties in 
question.   
Furthermore, the Bill allows for companies registered as plant breeders to seek civil 
action against those that commit certain offenses. Outlined in Section 58, such offenses include:  
A person who willfully (a) offers for sale, sells or markets the propagating material of a 
variety protected in Ghana; (b) markets propagating material of a variety protected in 
Ghana without the registered variety denomination; or (c) uses the registered variety 
denomination of a variety protected in Ghana for another variety of the same plant 
species or closely related species likely to cause confusion commits an offence and is 
liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than two thousand penalty units or to 
a term of imprisonment of not more than two years or to both. 
 
The above offenses are in line with Section 20.1, which lists propagating acts that require 
authorization from breeders: “(a) production or reproduction; (b) conditioning for the purpose of 
propagation; (c) an offer for sale; (d) sale or marketing; (e) exportation; (f) importation; and (g) 
stocking for any of the purposes mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f).” In any case where a plant 
breeder feels their plant breeder rights have been infringed upon, they have the ability to pursue 
civil remedies in accordance to Section 57: 
(1) Where a person is aggrieved by the infringement of a plant breeder right, that person 
may bring an action for (a) an order of injunction to prevent the commission or 
continuation of the commission of the act of infringement or to prohibit the continuation 
of the infringement; (b) the recovery of damages for the infringement; (c) the forfeiture, 
seizure or destruction of propagating or harvested material which has been produced 
contrary to this Act; (d) an order requiring the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue 
Authority to detain goods imported or ready for export; and (e) any other remedy that the 
court considers fit. 
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These sections ensure that large companies, such as Monsanto or Syngenta, can adequately 
enforce their policies in Ghana regarding their patented products without getting tied up in legal 
fights such as Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association, et al., v. Monsanto Company, et al. 
in the United States.217 It makes sense the Bill would provide such protections as it was designed 
under the recommendations found in Ghana’s G8NA Cooperative Framework, which seek to 
attract capital to Ghana’s agriculture sector. If companies are afforded such legal protection not 
only are their initial and future transaction costs lowered, but also long-term market projections 
increase; therefore, making investing in Ghana lucrative.  
 In addition to establishing enforcement mechanisms to safeguard plant breeders’ rights, 
the Bill also establishes an appeal board that can be controlled by private sector experts. Before 
discussing the powers of this board, it is vital to note that the Bill also creates a register of plant 
breeder rights, outlined in Section 41, that requires the Registrar-General, a member of the 
Ministry of Justice, to perform bureaucratic functions such as application processing, document 
collection, and third party variety testing.218 If a party feels the decision made by the Registrar is 
unfair or not correct, then the party may appeal the decision to the appeals board. According to 
Section 53, the aggrieved party has sixty days after the publication of the Registrar’s decision to 
submit an appeal to the appeal board, and the board “may confirm, set aside or vary any decision 
of the Registrar.” While this seems like a normal judicial hierarchy, the members of the appeal 
board provide reason to question the neutrality of the board.  
 The composition of the appeal board is laid out in Section 51. According to 51.2, “The 
Appeal Board consists of five members including one expert in legal and administrative matters 
and four experts qualified in agricultural science.” Furthermore, as specified by 51.5, “The 
Appeal Board may co-opt a person to act as an adviser at its meetings but that person shall not 
vote on a matter for decision at the meeting.” The Bill, by using the language “four experts 																																																								
217 Charlie Delacruz, “Supreme Court Denies Appeal from Farmers Seeking ‘Preemptive’ 
Protection from Future Patent Infringement Claims,” National Grain and Feed Association, 
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qualified in agricultural science,” invites private sector “experts” to sit on the appeal board. The 
only approval a member needs is that of the Minister of Justice, who, under Section 51.3, is 
given the authority to appoint the members of the board, and more than likely would approve of 
private sector experts tied to large agricultural companies considering the Minister is part of a 
government that accepted the terms of the G8NA Cooperation Framework. The adviser, on the 
other hand, only needs to be approved by the board; meaning anyone the board wants in the 
position can be placed there.  
 In essence, if this Bill and appeal board are ever passed and established, respectively, 
then the agricultural experts on the board have the real power in approving entities that apply for 
plant breeder status. In other words, the Registrar’s decision is a rubber stamp that conforms to 
the views of the appeal board, which, as demonstrated above, could easily be filled by affiliates 
of organizations such as ABInBev, Cargill, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, or the World 
Cocoa Foundation. Granted, in Section 53.10, it is stated that Ghana’s Supreme Court supersedes 
the appeal board in all matters, but, if the Bill itself is not ruled unconstitutional, then the Court 
would rule on any case brought to it regarding plant breeder rights under the framework 
established by the Bill. In such a case, the Court would likely side with the decision of the appeal 
board considering, as shown above, the broad, sweeping authority given to the board on matters 
related to plant breeder rights. This means the passage of Ghana’s Plant Breeders Bill will 
institutionalize the power of “experts qualified in agricultural science,” allow for companies 
registered as plant breeders to seek civil action against those that commit certain offenses, and 
preempt any future government regulations that may restrict the sale of agricultural products.  
 The assimilation and refinement of the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal 
principles through the specific paradigm of food security is an ongoing process where the G8NA 
dealings in Ghana are only a small part of a larger phenomenon. As this case study has attempted 
to demonstrate, PPPs have become a global governance norm through a process of knowledge 
development that has involved various actors across sectors. The most prominent international 
organization, the United Nations, spearheaded the normalization of PPPs through the 
MDGs/SDGs and provided guidelines for member states and other organizations to follow when 
dealing with the business community. The PPP concept has undergone and is still going through 
the fragmentation process, in which states have institutionalized PPPs differently, such as 
formalizing the notion in a public corporation or as part of a ministry, and the concept has been 
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acclimated to various sectors including cosmetics, electronics, and fossil fuels.  
 When it comes to PPPs and food security, the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition provides an example where the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles are 
put to work in a specific sector. Cooperation Frameworks, arrangements made under the G8NA 
and agreed to by participating governments and private organizations, have the exact same 
discourse focused on attracting private capital across countries. One role for governments in 
these PPPs is “developing and implementing domestic seed policies that encourage increased 
private sector involvement in this area.”219 In Ghana, this manifested as the 2013 Plant Breeders 
Bill. As demonstrated above, the Bill, if passed, would give private companies unprecedented 
power by allowing them to control the plant breeder application process, persecute those that 
violate the rights instilled by companies, and prevent the Ghanaian government from enacting 
future regulations. The Plant Breeders Bill is the epitome of neo-liberalization, and if passed 
would without a doubt entrench the private sector as a leader in global governance. Even without 
its passage, the PPP concept has developed as a norm continuing the erosion of the state and the 
empowering of private actors on the global front.  
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CHAPTER 5 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOOD SECURITY AND CONCLUSION 
When addressing world food concerns, the current food security paradigm, operating under the 
Corporate Food Regime, frequently neglects the fact that small-scale farms produce around 70 
percent of food consumed globally.220 One reason for disregarding this fact goes back to 1980s, 
when World Bank policies emphasized higher production and yields by offering credit and 
technical support for purchasing “industrial produced seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides.”221 
Programs such as these are less concerned about food sovereignty, and more concerned with 
food security and the idea that countries must modernize and develop towards certain Western 
standards characterized by monoculture, large-scale industrial farming, and biotechnology.222 
Such ideas are still perpetuated by the FAO, with one publication by the organization framing the 
transformation of the agricultural system in the following manner: 
We lay out three different typologies for food systems that correspond roughly with the 
development process. The first is a traditional food system, characterized by a dominance 
of traditional, unorganized supply chains and limited market infrastructure. The second is 
a structured food system, still characterized by traditional actors but with more rules and 
regulations applied to marketplaces and more market infrastructure…The third type is an 
industrialized food system, as observed throughout the developed world, with strong 
perceptions of safety, a high degree of coordination, a large and consolidated processing 
sector and organized retailers.223  
 
Such policies help concentrate capital in the bank accounts of corporations, which is evident by 
the consolidation of the international grain market where 75 percent is controlled by the five 
largest grain traders—Cargill, Bunge, Archer Daniels Midland, Gencore, and Dreyfus.224  
The concept of agriculture, however, is about more than just producing commodities—it 
is multifaceted. In addition to growing food, agricultural practices can have a multi-functionality 
that seeks to preserve landscapes, protect traditional knowledge and livelihoods, and ensure food 
security.225 Rather than promote private business solutions to produce higher quantities of food, 
global policy and international organizations should operationalize these multifaceted elements 																																																								
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and recognize food is not a normal commodity. Since food represents notions like people, 
cultures, and livelihoods, it is important to have a holistic alternative to the current food security 
paradigm. Movements like Via Campesina, translated as “the peasant way,” and MST 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, or Landless Workers’ Movement) have 
embraced such an alternative known as food sovereignty.226 As one of the founders of the food 
sovereignty movement and one of its biggest proponents, Via Campesina formally defined the 
concept at a convention in Mali: 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and 
consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of 
markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It 
offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and 
directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local 
producers. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and 
empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal - fishing, pastoralist-led 
grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, 
social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that 
guarantees just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food 
and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, 
seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food 
sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men 
and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations.227 
 
In other words, people have a right to healthy, culturally appropriate food produced in 
sustainable ways from local production systems free of corporate interests.  
Under the current food regime, farmers are limited to a role of harvesting raw materials, 
and surplus accumulated capital is used to finance corporate interests. The food sovereignty 
paradigm reimagines farmers’ roles by involving them in material processing, marketing and 
selling, and policymaking, while surplus accumulated capital would be used to strengthen local 
farming capacities and improve livelihoods.228 Other benefits brought about by food sovereignty 
include bringing consumers and farmers closer together, protecting farmers from dumping, 
increasing the availability of fresh, healthy food for consumers, locking out unwanted genetically 																																																								
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engineered crops, and returning power to local growers over transnational corporations.229 One of 
the biggest obstacles in achieving food sovereignty, however, is that issues such as dumping are 
controlled by corporate monopolies/oligopolies, which are subsidized by governments. As such, 
the topic of dismantling such power structures has not been on the negotiating table, but, as 
farmer organizations have made clear, addressing such concerns is vital to overhauling the global 
food paradigm.230  
The concerns of ordinary farmers and organizations like Via Campesina received 
international recognition in 2008. In conjunction with the economic recession hitting the world at 
that time, food prices soared creating a food epidemic.231 This prompted the United Nations to 
investigate the issue, resulting in the 2008 UN Human Rights Council Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food. The report concludes with the following: 
The current situation creates opportunities. But opportunities should not be mistaken for 
solutions. While more must be invested in agriculture and rural infrastructure in order to 
make up for years of neglect, how the investments are targeted, which forms they take, 
and what their effects are, must be carefully monitored. If a new global partnership for 
agriculture and food is to emerge from the current crisis, it is crucial to ensure that this 
partnership does not simply seek to boost supply by promoting technology-driven 
recipes, but also empowers those who are hungry and malnourished and whose 
livelihoods may be threatened by precisely this renewed interest in encouraging 
agricultural production. A human rights framework would contribute to keeping the 
search for solutions on this track, because it would ensure that the most vulnerable will be 
given priority, and because it would improve accountability and participation in decision-
making. It is therefore regrettable that such a framework has been almost entirely absent 
from current discussions.232 
 
In further suggestions made by Special Rapporteur Olivier De Schutter, he reminds readers of 
the complications brought about by corporate seed regimes, recommends ensuring the right to 
adequate food over simply boosting the supply of food, and speaks to the danger of indicators 
and benchmarks like those found in the G8 Cooperation Frameworks.233 The foresight of the 
Special Rapporteur is in line with the food sovereignty paradigm, but as the case study here 																																																								
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shows, the partnership that formed to combat food insecurity, the G8 New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition, followed exactly what the Special Rapporteur advised against—further 
showcasing how the private sector is entrenched in global governance and shapes policies 
according to its interests.   
As the corporate takeover of state institutions under neoliberal reregulation demonstrates, 
corporations will use any means necessary to further their bottom line, and if successful will 
completely make government an extension of private interests. Despite their massive amount of 
wealth and power, corporations are far outnumbered by ordinary people—meaning action by 
civil society is vital.234 Civil society consists of actors such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), political parties, religious and charitable organizations, and professional 
associations.235Some civil society actors advocate for governments to exercise the precautionary 
principle when it comes to genetically engineered organisms, which is to say that there should be 
reluctance to use such products without knowing the ultimate effects of their use.236 Via 
Campesina is an example of such a civil society actor. It has grown to include over 150 
organizations residing from fifty-six countries within its network, and has key features that 
should set the example for other civil society actors.237  
First, Via Campesina’s leaders are farmer-activists meaning the leadership comes from 
the base and understands the struggles of members from first hand experience. This is different 
than what is found in other organizations where intellectual outsiders can be directing efforts. 
Second, the vision of the organization is not region specific allowing for a wide coalition of 
actors from the Global North and South to come together. In other words, Via Campesina can 
build large networks that consist of small farmers, indigenous peoples, pastoralists, 
environmentalists, consumers, environmentalists, human rights advocates, and religious 
groups.238 Lastly, the organization has been able to successfully put gender at the forefront of its 
policy demands. This is important because women make up the majority of Africa’s small 
farmers—which produce 80 percent of the continent’s agriculture—and comprise 43 percent of 
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the global agricultural work force.239 These features help ordinary people campaign against 
MNCs on a transnational front, while others that are not farmers can utilize their buying power to 
oppose policies they dislike by supporting small producers that operate under similar polices 
practiced by Via Campesina and its associates.  
Civil society should also act as a watchdog to monitor and be critical of governments and 
firms. While civil society actors, like NGOs, may receive assistance from governments, these 
groups need be cautious about accepting funds. In some cases, such as Norwegian NGOs 
partnering with the Norwegian government to bring about an international treaty to ban 
landmines, civil society actors may be able to carve out political space and obtain a higher level 
of agency.240 It is possible, however, for NGOs to receive funding from states and to be co-opted 
by governments to follow government agendas rather than their own aims to continue receiving 
money.241 Therefore, it is essential for civil society actors to maintain their autonomy in order to 
remain effective. Otherwise, they may simply become an extension of the state, which under the 
market-state paradigm is an extension of large corporations.   
Ultimately, increasing local people’s political clout will achieve food sovereignty. This is 
done through capacity building, establishing transnational networks with various societies, and 
empowering bottom-up citizen movements.242 Doing this, however, requires going against the 
norms now solidifying in global governance. By examining the creation of norms and certain 
identities and interests, this study has shown how other motives besides food security, such as 
the spread of neoliberal policies and corporate interests, inform and shape PPPs and global 
agricultural development. Whether or not such secondary intentions are the primary drivers of 
such partnerships, those advocating for the food sovereignty paradigm will certainly have to go 
against the food security model favored by powerful international organizations, the G8, and 
corporations.  
While PPPs may be effective in promoting food security, they are simultaneously 
creating global neoliberal norms that consolidate power for few entities by introducing new 																																																								
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regulations via a process of neo-liberalization. The importance of these partnerships rests upon 
the fact that their existence and continued use by policymakers is affecting global norms. Further 
studies into PPPs are vital to ensure world politics continue to operate in a manner that serves 
people’s interests over corporate ones. This study has presented an initial exploration of PPPs to 
gain a better understanding of such relationships, and can serve as a launch pad for future 
qualitative or quantitative studies that further explain PPP practices within specific sectors in 
extensive detail.  
By examining how norms are created through a cognitive process of knowledge 
development that analyzes the normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation of concepts, this 
study has contributed to the literature and understanding of PPPs by exploring how such 
relationships have reshaped global governance by entrenching the private sector at the forefront 
of the policymaking process—specifically in relation to food security. The private partners 
behind the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition have embedded their interests in 
the discourses that form the G8NA Cooperation Frameworks, which have been signed and 
implemented by several African countries. In Ghana, such discourse favoring biotech and 
agricultural companies materialized as the 2013 Plant Breeders Bill. Though the Parliament of 
Ghana has yet to pass the Bill, the language contained in it would allow for private companies 
such as AbInBev, Cargill, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, and any other interested firms to 
create and control markets in the last frontier of agricultural development. Such discourse serves 
only the interests of private enterprises and their shareholders, not small producers trying to 
make a living. If people across the world wish to see enhanced autonomy for themselves and 
governments accountable to their citizens instead of transnational corporate entities, then they 
should reconsider the power given to the private part of public-private partnerships.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AFSA – Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa 
AGRA – Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
BMZ – Germany Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
BRC – British Retail Consortium 
CAADP - Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program 
CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility  
DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency 
EAA – Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance 
EFSA – European Food Safety Authority 
EPA – Economic Partnership Agreements 
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization 
FTSE – Financial Times Stock Exchange  
G8NA – G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
GAIN - Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition  
GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GMO – Genetically Modified Organism 
IFS – International Food Standard 
ILSI – International Life Science Institute 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IPA – Infrastructure and Projects Authority 
IUK – Infrastructure UK 
MDG – Millennium Development Goals 
MEP – Member of European Parliament 
MNC – Multinational Corporation 
MPA – Major Projects Authority 
MST – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra 
NDC – New Democratic Congress 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization  
NPM – New Public Management 
NPP – New Patriotic Party 
NTB – Non-Tariff Barriers 
PID – Public Investment Division 
PPP – Public-Private Partnership 
SAP – Structural Adjustment Program 
SDG – Sustainable Development Goals 
SUN – Scaling-Up Nutrition 
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly 
USAID – U.S. Agency for International Development 
WCF – World Cocoa Foundation 
WFS – World Food Summit 
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